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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
WOODLAND THEATRES, INC., 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., a corporation, and 
PLITT INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, 
INC., a corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff-appellant Woodland Theatres, Inc., 
(hereinafter "Woodland") hereby appeals from the trial court's 
Order of Summary Judgment in favor of the defendant-respondent 
Plitt Intermountain Theatres, Inc., (hereinafter "Plitt") in 
separate actions filed by Woodland for unlawful detainer and 
for breach of lease and termination of leasehold. 
On or about March 9, 1971, the plaintiff-appellant 
Woodland entered into a lease agreement with ABC Intermountain 
Theatres, Inc., (hereinafter "ABC"). ABC leased real 
property commonly known and referred to as the Woodland Drive-in 
Case No. 14440 
Case No. 14441 
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Theatre from Woodland for a period of fifteen (15) years. 
By the terms of the lease agreement, ABC covenanted to keep 
the theatre premises in good repair and to make certain 
improvements to the physical plant of the theatre. ABC 
further covenanted not to assign the leasehold without 
securing written permission from the lessor. The lease pro-
vided for a fixed monthly rental plus percentages of the gross 
gate receipts and concession sales above certain amounts. 
ABC flagrantly and repeatedly breached the lease 
agreement by assigning the leasehold without Woodland's 
authorization, by allowing the theatre premises to deteriorate 
physically and by not making the improvements to the physical 
plant of the theatre clearly required by the lease terms. 
ABC and Plitt did not run the Woodland Drive-in Theatre 
business in good faith, and consequently, Woodland received 
negligible amounts under the percentage rental provisions of 
the lease agreement. In light of ABC's breaches and lack of 
good faith performance of the lease agreement, Woodland filed 
two actions: one under the Utah unlawful detainer statute, 
U.C.A. § 78-36-3; and one for breach of the lease and termination 
of the leasehold. 
On December 12, 1975, ABC's assignee Plitt moved for 
summary judgment in both actions on the ground that Woodland 
I 
had waived any and all claims for breaches, violations and 
-2-
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forfeitures under the lease agreement by accepting rent, 
and that as a matter of law Woodland had no claim for 
damages under the percentage rental provisions of the lease. 
The trial court granted defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Whereupon Woodland brought this appeal. 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
I. Did the trial court err in holding that as a 
matter of law Woodland waived the defendants-respondents1 
forfeiture of the leasehold by accepting rental payments? 
II. Did the trial court err in holding that as a 
matter of law Woodland waived all of the defendants-respondents' 
breaches of the lease agreement by accepting rental payments? 
III. Did the trial court err in holding that as a 
matter of law there was no implied covenant on the part of 
the defendants-respondents to operate the Woodland Drive-in 
Theatre in good faith so that Woodland could receive the full 
benefit of performance under the lease agreement? 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
After the complaints in these actions had been filed 
and before completion of discovery, the defendant-respondent 
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Plitt moved, pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, for summary judgment in both actions and for a 
consolidated hearing of its motions. Woodland responded with 
a memorandum of points and authorities in opposition to Plitt's 
motions for summary judgment. The hearing on the motions, 
consolidated pursuant to stipulation of counsel for the 
parties, was held on December 12, 1975. At the close of the 
hearing, the court granted Plitt's motion for summary judgment 
regarding Woodland's claims of forfeiture of the leasehold 
and breaches of the lease agreement arising from alleged 
failures to repair, maintain and improve the physical plant 
of the Woodland Drive-In Theatre. The plaintiff-appellant 
Woodland files this brief seeking to reverse the trial court's 
summary judgment rulings. ,
 H k 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. The Lease Agreement and Its Provisions. 
On or about March 9, 1971, the plaintiff-appellant 
Woodland entered into a lease agreement with the defendant 
ABC. (A copy of the lease agreement is attached as Exhibit A.) 
Woodland Theatres, Inc., is a Utah corporation owning real 
property known as the Woodland Drive-in Theatre, located at 
4005 South, 700 East, Salt Lake County, Utah. According to the 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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provisions of the lease agreement, Woodland leased the 
Woodland Drive-In Theatre to ABC for a fifteen (15) year 
term, with an option to renew the lease for an additional five 
(5) years. (See Exhibit A, Paragraphs 1 and 20.) 
ABC agreed to pay a fixed annual rental of $32,500.00 
in equal monthly installments throughout the term of the 
lease. In addition, ABC covenanted to pay an annual percentage 
rental of fifteen percent (15%) of the gross admission receipts 
above $183,333.00 and fifteen percent (15%) of the gross 
concession receipts in excess of $65,000.00. The lease 
provided that ABC's records of gross admission and concession 
receipts would be open for Woodland's inspection during regular 
business hours. (See Exhibit A, Paragraph 2.) 
Respecting maintenance, ABC covenanted, inter alia, 
to keep the theatre premises in good repair, replacing worn 
out or damaged equipment at its own expense. (See Exhibit A, 
Paragraph 8.) ABC further agreed to make improvements to the 
theatre premises, including enlarging the snack bar to 
approximately double its initial size, oiling and spreading 
a layer of rock chips on the theatre grounds, resurfacing 
portions of the theatre premises and repainting the theatre 
screen. (See Exhibit A, Paragraphs 7, 25, 28.) ABC also 
covenanted not to assign the leasehold without obtaining 
Woodland's written permission, not to be unreasonably withheld. 
(See Exhibit A, Paragraph 11.) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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B. The Defendants-Respondents' Performance Under 
The Lease, 
ABC only operated the Woodland Drive-In Theatre 
until the beginning of the year, 1974. At that time, ABC 
assigned the lease to a successor corporation, Plitt Inter-
mountain Theatres, Inc., and Plitt and its employees took over 
the management of the theatre without any notice being given 
to Woodland. The substitution of Plitt for ABC constituted 
an unauthorized transfer of the leasehold in clear violation 
of the express terms of Paragraph 11 of the lease agreement 
providing that "[t]he Lessee [ABC] covenants and agrees that 
it will not assign this lease or enter into any sublease of 
the premises or any part thereof, without the written consent 
of the Lessor... ." (See Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 2.) 
Neither Plitt nor ABC have adequately maintained 
the physical plant of the theatre, and it has deteriorated both 
visually and operationally over time. On an inspection of 
the theatre premises on June 24, 1974, Woodland found the 
theatre grounds strewn with papers and other garbage, the 
fence leaning and broken down in places, and water running through 
part of the theatre from a broken sprinkler connection. 
Several speaker posts were broken, the screen tower paint 
was peeling and the screen was bare in places. The snack bar 
-6-
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addition was blocked off from the operating portion of the 
concession area by a cinder block wall, and the electrical 
system of the theatre was partially burned out, with auxiliary 
ground cables running to the back of the snack bar supplying 
power. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Interrogatories, 
Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.) 
At a further inspection at the theatre on July 26, 
1974, employees of Woodland observed the west and north 
driveways of the theatre broken and pitted in places, the theatre 
screen stained with rust and its paint peeling, several
 ; 
speaker posts broken down and many water connections broken. 
Many of the bubble lights at the entrance to the theatre 
were broken or removed, the fence was weathered and unpainted, 
and many speakers previously removed were unreplaced. At that 
time, the broken sprinkler, noted before, remained unrepaired, 
and some of the wiring through the theatre was still not 
functioning. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Interroga-
tories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.) The plaintiff-appellant's 
representatives inspected the theatre again on July 31, 1974 
and found that the deteriorating conditions observed on 
July 26 had not been corrected. In addition, they found that 
there were peeling paint and standing water within the oper-
ating snack bar, and the surface of the theatre was in need of 
an application of oil and rock chips. The fence was patched 
-7-
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with odd pieces of wood and propped up by two-by-fours in 
placesf and two large wires taped to an open junction box 
were exposed, with a large "Danger" sign painted near -
them. Seventy (70) speakers were totally inoperable, and 
forty-seven (47) more gave poor sound. (Plaintiff's 
Response to Defendant's Interrogatories, Answer to Inter-
rogatory No. 4.) 
By allowing the physical plant of the Woodland c--
Drive-in Theatre to deteriorate to a great extent, ABC and 
Plitt undermined the business of the theatre. The facilities 
that they provided were inadequate to accommodate the 
theatre's patrons. For example, on or about June 24, 1975, 
Eugene Woodland was contacted by Kenny Lloyd, local branch 
manager for Twentieth Century Fox. Mr. Lloyd reported that 
during a showing of a Fox film at the Woodland Drive-in 
Theatre, only 518 speakers were operational, and the theatre 
was turning away hundreds of patrons due to the unavailability 
of operable speakers. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 4.) 
.»-•• ABC had covenanted in the lease agreement to enlarge 
i 
the snack bar to approximately double its size at the inception 
of the agreement within six (6) months of the effective date 
of the lease. (See Exhibit A, Paragraph 7.) An addition to 
the snack bar was constructed, but until August of 1975 it was 
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blocked off from the operating portion of the snack bar and 
used solely for storage. (Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's 
Interrogatories, Answer to Interrogatory No. 5.) Projected 
increases in concession sales were thus stifled by the 
defendants-respondents' lack of good faith in implementing 
the provisions of the lease agreement mandating an addition 
to the snack bar. 
C. Woodland's Suits 
Woodland filed its action against ABC and Plitt for 
unlawful detainer on August 21, 1974 and its action for breach 
of the lease and termination of the leasehold on September 24, 
1974. Prior to those filings, a notice of default and notice to 
quit the Woodland Drive-In Theatre premises were served on ABC 
and Plitt on August 2, 1974, and from that date, Woodland did 
not accept rental payments for subsequent periods of the 
defendants-respondents' occupancy of the theatre premises. 
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 6-7.) 
Negotiations aimed at settling the differences 
between Woodland and the defendants-respondents were conducted 
by counsel for the parties, and a tentative agreement was 
reached in December, 1974. Assuming that the settlement would 
be ratified by the defendants-respondents, Woodland accepted 
rental payments soon thereafter as a good faith gesture, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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fully intending to continue its actions if the settle-
ment should fall through. When the terms of the negotiated 
settlement were repudiated by the defendants-respondents, 
Woodland continued with the prosecution of its lawsuits, 
(Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defen-
dant 's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 7.) 
The defendant-respondent Plitt subsequently moved 
for summary judgment in both of Woodland's actions on the ground 
that by accepting rental payments, Woodland thereby waived all 
of Plittfs and ABC's breaches of the lease agreement, Plitt 
also argued that as a matter of law there was no implied 
obligation under the lease agreement to make payments under 
its percentage rental provisions, introducing no factual 
evidence in support of its argument. The trial court granted 
summary judgment in Plitt's favor on Woodland's claims of 
forfeiture of the leasehold and breaches of the lease agreement 
through failure to repair, maintain and improve the theatre 
premises. However, its rulings were based solely on the 
flat, legal propositions advanced by the defendants-respondents, 
and it made no factual determinations relating to Woodland's 
claims. Woodland appeals to this Court to reverse the trial 
court's holdings and reinstate its actions for unlawful 
detainer and breach of the lease and termination of the lease-
hold. 
-10-
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ARGUMENT 
!• The trial court erred in finding that as a 
matter of law, Woodland waived the defendants-respondents1 
forfeiture of the leasehold and breaches off the lease agree-
ment by accepting rent. Initially it should be noted that 
defendants1 motion for summary judgment was based solely 
upon the fact that plaintiff had accepted rent. Defendant 
did not assert or show that as a matter of uncontroverted 
fact, plaintiff had expressed or demonstrated an intent to 
waive its claims of forfeiture. The defendant did not assert 
or show that as a matter of uncontroverted fact the plaintiff 
had undertaken activities which clearly constituted a waiver 
of its claims of forfeiture. The defendant relied solely 
on the proposition that the acceptance of rent by a landlord 
as a matter of law, and without regard to the attendant 
factual circumstances, waives all past claims of forfeiture 
and breach. That proposition is clearly erroneous and the 
Court's acceptance thereof in its order of summary judgment 
is improper and should be reversed. 
A. Woodland did not waive the defendants-respondents' 
forfeiture of the leasehold by accepting rent. Waiver is 
uniformly recognized as the intentional relinquishment of a 
known right. See Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. Klein, 218 S.W. 
-11-
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2d 595,, 599 (Mo. 1949). In the disposition of a claim of 
waiver, it is the intention of the party charged with making 
the waiver which is controlling. See Brazeal v. Bokelman, 
270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th Cir. 1959); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, 
Inc., 95 F.2d 306, 309 (2d Cir. 1938). 
Accordingly, a determination of whether a landlord 
has waived a right or claim of forfeiture to a leasehold is 
a factual question concerning the intentional relinguishment 
by the landlord. Concerning the showing which must be made 
in order to establish a waiver, the Missouri Supreme Court 
in Lucas Hunt Village Co. v. Klein, 218 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1949), 
unauthorized subletting, affirmed the rule that: 
. . . [T]he intention of the.party charged with 
making the waiver is controlling, and if not 
shown by express declaration, but implied by 
conduct, there must be a clear, unequivocal and 
decisive act of the party showing such purpose, 
and so manifestly consistent with and indicative 
of an intention to waive that no other reasonable 
explanation is possible. Lucas Hunt Village Co. 
v. Kelin, 218 S.W.2d 595, 599 (Mo. 1949). 
See also B.J.M. Realty Corp. v. Ruggieri, 326 F.2d 281, 284 
(2d Cir. 1963); Brazeal v. Bokelman, 270 F.2d 943, 947 (8th 
-12-
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Cir. 1959); In re Wil-Low Cafeterias, Inc., 95 F.2d 306, 
309 (2d Cir. 1938); Miller v, Reidy, 260 P. 358, 360 (Cal. 
1927). 
In suits involving a claim of forfeiture of a 
leasehold., courts have been unwilling to find claims of 
forfeiture or breach waived by the mere acceptance of rent 
in circumstances in which the landlord had evidenced a 
contrary intent. In that regard courts have recognized the 
institution of litigation against a tenant as a clear 
indication that the landlord has elected and is pursuing its 
right of forfeiture despite the fact that rental payments 
are made in the interim. 
For example, in the case of Fogel v. Hogan, 496 
P.2d 322, 324 (Colo. 1972), defendants filed a cross claim 
to terminate a lease, asserting as a basis therefore that the 
premises had not been maintained as provided in the lease. 
The tenant argued that the landlord had waived its claims of 
breach by accepting rental payments during the pendency of 
the action. The Colorado Supreme Court of Appeals, however, 
held that: 
. . . when a tenant continues in possession 
pending a determination of an action brought 
by the landlord to enforce a forfeiture, 
the tenant is under an obligation to pay 
rent and acceptance of these payments does 
not constitute waiver of the breach. 
(496 P.2d at 324.) 
-13-
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Similarly, in Merkowitz v, Mahoney, 215 P. 2d 317 
(Colo. 1949), a landlord brought suit to repossess a leasehold 
charging that the tenant had operated the premises in violation 
of the law and in breach of the lease. The tenant argued 
that the landlord's acceptance of rent during the pendency 
of the action constituted a waiver of its claims of forfeiture. 
Rejecting the tenant's argument, the Supreme Court of Colorado 
stated: 
Where the landlord upon breach of a covenant 
gives notice of forfeiture and brings an action 
for possession/ his suit presumably constitutes 
a final election to terminate the lease. The 
lease being terminated, the landlord is entitled 
to possession, and neither the landlord nor tenant 
is further bound by provisions of the lease as to 
the remainder of its term. However, where the 
right of the landlord to forfeit the term is disputed 
by the tenant and he continues in possession 
pending a determination of the action brought 
by the landlord to enforce a forfeiture, the 
tenant is under obligation of payment to the 
landlord for his possession. (Id..at 320.) 
The court held that although a landlord could agree 
during the pendency of litigation to accept back rent and 
terminate litigation, a determination of whether payments 
accepted during litigation were pursuant to such an agreement 
would have to be made from the circumstances of the case. 
(215 P.2d at 321.) The court, however, clearly held that the 
receipt of rental does not necessarily constitute waiver. In 
that regard, the court adopted the reasoning expressed in 
-id-
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Myers v. Herskowitz, 165 P. 1031, 1033 (Cal. 1917), quoting 
that decision as follows: 
The tenant having succeeded in retaining pos-
session of the premises during the pendency 
of the action, plaintiff was entitled to compen-
— sation therefor, and after the benefit had 
been received by the defendant the plaintiff 
might reasonably accept such compensation to 
which he was entitled without being held to 
have waived the right of action which he was 
then prosecuting. 
See also Fogel v. Hogan, 496 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1972); Wecht v. 
Anderson, 444 P.2d 501, 505 (Nev. 1968). 
In this case the clear intent expressed and demon-
strated at all times by the plaintiff-appellant was to fully 
litigate its claims of forfeiture. At no time did Woodland 
express or imply that its claims for forfeiture or breach 
would be dropped absent a full settlement with defendants-
respondents, nor has it by its course of action given any 
indication to that effect. In this regard, it is important 
to note that defendants-respondents made no claim whatsoever 
that plaintiff-appellant led them to believe it was waiving 
its claims of forfeiture. Defendants-respondents did not 
assert that they held that belief in reliance upon any actions 
of the plaintiff-appellant. On the contrary, defendants-
respondents rely solely on the fact that Woodland accepted 
the rent for defendants1respondents' possession of its 
property during the pendency of the actions to defeat 
-15-
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Woodland's claims. Such a superficial analysis cannot support 
summary judgment, particularly in the absence of any factual 
determinations whatsoever. The trial court's order of 
summary judgment should be reversed and Woodland's claims 
of forfeiture of the leasehold reinstated. 
B. Woodland did not waive the defendants-respondents' 
breaches of the lease agreement by accepting rent. The 
principle that a clearly demonstrated intent is essential to 
a finding of waiver applies with even greater force to 
substantive breaches of the lease agreement than to the for-
feitures discussed in the preceding section. A lessor does 
not forfeit all rights to enforce the terms of a lease 
agreement by accepting rental payments. Nevertheless, defen-
dants based their motion for summary judgment on the ground 
that acceptance of rent by a landlord with knowledge of 
breaches of the lease agreement, without more, waives those 
breaches as a matter of law, and its motion was granted by 
the trial court. 
To the contrary, courts have held that material 
breaches of a lease agreement are not waived by the acceptance 
of rent. See Atkinson v. Trehan, 334 N.Y.S. 2d 293 (1972); 
Wecht v. Anderson, 444 P.2d 501, 504-05 (Nev. 1968); Klein 
v. Longo, 34 A.2d 359, 360 (Mun. Ct. of Appeals, 
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D.C. 1943). In the Wecht case, the lessee had covenanted 
to construct a fifty (50) ton capacity retort for refining 
mercury on mineral-rich land by a certain date and never 
fulfilled that obligation. In the meantime, the lessor 
continued to accept rent but ultimately sought to terminate 
the lease on the basis of the lessee's breach in not 
building the retort. The court ruled that the lessor had not 
waived the lessee's breach by accepting rental payments 
with knowledge of the breach. 
In Fogel v. Hogan, 496 P.2d 322 (Colo. 1972), the 
lessee failed adequately to maintain the leased premises and 
thus breached the maintenance provision of the lease agree-
ment. Id. at 324. In a suit filed by the lessee against the 
lessors, the lessors filed a cross-claim for termination of 
the leasehold and continued to collect rental payments through-
out the pendency of the action. The lessee argued that the 
lessors had waived any breaches of the lease agreement by 
accepting rent while their action proceeded. However, the 
court disagreed, finding that the lessee was obligated to 
continue making rental payments as long as he remained on the 
leased premises. Id. The factual situation in the Fogel case 
is strikingly similar to that in the actions presently before 
this Court, and the same principle should apply. 
To accept the defendants-respondents' argument that 
the acceptance of rent waives all foregoing breaches of a lease 
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agreement as a matter of law would narrowly limit the choice 
of remedies available to a lessor faced with a lessee's 
breaches. The lessor would be left with the options of 
foregoing rent while filing suit to terminate the leasehold, 
or of accepting rent while suffering the consequences of the 
lessee's breaches without redress. The proposition is absurd 
on its face. 
A landlord is fully entitled to enforce the terms 
of a lease without requiring its termination. The injured 
lessor thus may file suit to require compliance with pro-
visions of a lease agreement or to secure an award of damages for 
the lessee's breaches while receiving payments of rent. 
-18-
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II. The trial court erred in granting summary 
judgment on Woodland's claims regarding the defendants-respondents1 
implied obligations under the lease agreement. In its 
complaint for breach of the lease and termination of the lease-
hold, Woodland alleges that the defendants-respondents 
breached the lease agreement by failing to operate the 
Woodland Drive-in Theatre in a prudent and businesslike 
manner. In addition to the fixed annual rental established 
in the lease agreement, ABC covenanted to pay an annual . 
percentage rental of fifteen percent (15%) of the concession 
receipts above $65f000.00. (See Exhibit Af Paragraph 2.) 
The complaint avers and plaintiff-appellant will show, if 
allowed to proceed at trial, that defendants-respondents 
failed to fulfill their covenants to maintain and improve 
the theatre and, in fact, were grossly negligent in its 
maintenance and operation. The direct consequence of defen-
dants-respondents' manifold breaches of the lease agreement 
was to totally frustrate plaintiff-appellant's opportunity 
to realize the benefits intended from the percentage rental 
provision. 
Defendants-respondents moved for summary judgment 
respecting plaintiff-appellant's claims under the percentage 
rental provisions solely on the ground that as a matter of 
law a percentage rental provision does not give rise to any 
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duties on the part of the lessee respecting operation or 
maintenance of the theatre in order to produce revenue 
therefrom. In their motion, defendants-respondents do not 
attempt to demonstrate any uncontroverted facts concerning the 
activities of the parties in this case or their intent in 
subscribing to the subject provision of the lease. Defendants-
respondents make no attempt to demonstrate what the parties 
intended by the lease agreement nor to demonstrate that on 
the basis of the facts involved in this case, duties averred 
by the plaintiff-appellant could not have arisen. Defendants-
respondents' sole basis for the motion for summary judgment is 
the single proposition that as a matter of law a percentage 
lease provision does not give rise to the duties averred by 
plaintiff-appellant. ^ 
Defendants-respondents1 motion must fail for, 
inter alia, two basic reasons. First, the controlling authorities 
fail to support defendants-respondents' contention that, as 
a matter of law, percentage lease agreements do not give 
rise to duties concerning operation of and production of 
income from a leasehold. Second, the controlling authorities 
clearly hold that the duties attendent to a percentage lease 
agreement can only be ascertained by a determination of the 
intent of the parties and of the surrounding facts and 
circumstances. 
-20-
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The cases cited by defendants-respondents make 
it clear that in order to adjudicate the rights of a lessor 
under a percentage lease agreement, the court must make specific 
reference to the facts before it. Further, the only Utah case 
cited by defendants-respondents concerning a situation similar 
to that before the Court clearly demonstrates the Utah 
Supreme Court's embrace of the principle that a lessee under 
a percentage lease agreement may have substantive obligations 
concerning the operation of its business on the premises. 
In Flowers v. Wrights, 227 P.2d 768 (Utah 1951), the Court 
considered a claim by a lessor for additional rentals which it 
attributed to the business done by a sublessee. In this 
case, the lessee had agreed to pay a rental based upon a 
percentage of its total sales. At the time the lease was 
entered into, however, the Court held that the lessee was 
given the right to sublease and the parties contemplated 
that the sales of the sublessee would not be included within 
the terms of the percentage rental agreement. In discussing 
the legal standards applicable generally to a percentage 
lease situation, the court cited the case of Cissna Loan 
Company v. Baron, 149 Wash, 386, 270 P. 1022 (1928). The 
court stated that it did not disagree with the findings in 
the Cissna case but distinguished the case on the grounds that 
the lease before it specifically excluded the sales of the 
sublessee. 
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In the Cissna case a lessee occupied a building 
«*,., — — — — — 
with rental consideration provided through a percentage ^ 
DXiXDSqa SMSM . ztBIffll chUfOO ' S i l t
 H : M S m ^ T p r - ^ . : P r n r . . , _ . , . . . , 
of gross sales of a department store conducted by lessee in 
_ the building. After taking occupancy the lessee moved two 
I f iXXaUo fiGW S i ^ i *
 fi 5 r t X a ^ © 0 « O D B 8 ^ f l S f t f t O a 8 8 7 - a ; J / t a f > r T ^ a K - € *<**. 
important departments of his store to ah ad^oiAiilg5building. 
ft-Vff'r f* 
The court held that the lessor was entitled to a percentage 
•*yr,— -
/ o f the sales in those departments. "u"dfl!9 8 ' ^ ^ emesqua 
^ -a- ^ YAW c* v x .*, U .o , j << vxJ-i 8 O *^£j fl V *\ Or f rt t^ frkfzex*v v^r* ^
 r r « r 
In distinguishing the Cissna case", the Utah Supreme 
Court held that unlike the case before'TfcV in the Cissna case 
^ there was no clear contemplation at the time of signing the 
^•f f* *,rhht: -r.~.-*~. - *• - < -
lease that such a move of departments would take place,OD 
Comparing those facts to the instant suit, the parties clearly 
B floqrr haasd Is^nsi a ysa oj 5»e:r*>* hBn ^ * ^ r ' ^ ^ 
expressed the affirmative covenants which Wbtrld haife direct 
bearing on the gross percentage rental figure. This is not 
a case where a lessee has moved a department or moved ari° 
be^Blqiminoo aei-j^sa #rf-t br* ^ ^ rw»?p ~* J^^;». . ,... .. ,. 
aspect of business. Rather, it is a case where the lessee 
a iii - • 
has intentionally and negligently failed to fulfill theUJ 
p n l . -. .. • • 
covenants of the agreement which have direct implication in 
the profitability of the business. Further/ the Cissna case 
and the adoption of its principles in Flowers by the Utah 
aril *|8£ei) ££CU .1 OVSr.'^SE .ifaBW.eftr ^dv^-- ^  . • ^ ^ - n 
Supreme Court clearly support the fihding^«Fobligations on 
the part of a lessee under a gross rental provision to conduct 
i B i f j ••• 
its business in good faith in order that the lessor has % 
od:* to aelca srf:f b^ftr^nxe vff^.^1-^^** •* f <-•,-?-^ -^  ,.,,.•• .• 
fair opportunity to realize the benefit of tftat provision. 
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In this respect, it is important also to note that 
in Flowers v. Wrights, the Utah Supreme Court clearly stated 
that an intentional effort on the part of the lessee to 
reduce the percentage rental was clearly actionable. In this 
respect, the Supreme Court stated: 
Doubtless the reason why the lessee's right 
to sub-let space was so restricted was to 
prevent the lessee from using the right to 
sub-lease space as a device to reduce the 
percentage rental which would ordinarily 
accrue to the lessor. Numerous cases are 
cited by the plaintiffs to the effect that a 
lessee cannot use the authority to sub-let 
as such a device. With that principle we 
are in complete accord. 
The holding of the Utah Supreme Court is consistent 
with the standards embraced by Williston on Contracts, Rev. 
Ed., Vol. 1, § 104A, at 357: 
A third class of cases, not wholly inconsistent 
with the first, finds from the business 
situation, from the conduct of the parties, 
and from the startlingly disproportionate 
burden otherwise cast upon one of them, a 
promise implied in fact by the seller to 
continue in good faith production or sales, 
or on the part of the buyer to maintain his 
business or plant as a going concern and to 
take its bona fide requirements. In other 
words, this view implies an obligation to carry 
out the contract in the way anticipated, and not 
for purposes of speculation to the injury of 
the other party. 
Embracing the principle above-referenced, the Court 
in State Auto & Cas. Underwriters v. Salisbury, 494 P.2d 
529, 531 (Utah 1972), stated: 
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Arising from what is commonly known and 
accepted as to the customs and experience 
in the everyday affairs of life, the parties 
each has the right to assume that the other 
will perform the duties he agrees to with 
reasonable care, competence, diligence and 
good faith, even though such terms are not 
expressly spelled out in the contract... . 
See also Beaugureau v. Beaugureau, 463 P.2d 540, 542 (Ariz. 
1970); Coleman Eng'r Co. v. North Amer. Aviation Inc., 420 
P.2d 713, 720 (Cal. 1966); Miller v. Othello Packers, Inc., 
410 P.2d 33, 34 (Wash. 1966). 
In Flowers v. Wrights, however, the court clearly 
found that the good faith of the lessee had not been questioned 
in any respect. In this case, the lack of good faith of the 
lessee is the thrust of plaintiff-appellant1s claims which 
are the subject of defendants-respondents' motion. 
Further, supportive of the Utah Supreme Court's 
finding are a substantial number of decisions from other 
jurisdictions which, in contravention to the findings of 
the cases cited by defendants, clearly impose upon a lessee 
under a percentage lease agreement obligations to fulfill 
the fair expectations of the lessor under that provision. 
In Selber Bros., Inc. v. Newstadt's Shoe Stores, 
194 So. 579 (La. 1940), the Supreme Court of Louisiana held 
that a lessor stated a valid cause of action seeking additional 
rent under a percentage rental agreement complaining of lessee's 
-24-
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substitution of a store specializing in close-out sales of 
cheap brands and slow-moving old styles of shoes for a 
"high-class and fashionable store/1 194 So. at 580. The 
lessor obviously intended that the lessee would maintain a 
quality merchandise shoe store on the leasehold premises during 
the lease term, but once again the ruling was made in spite of 
a minimum rental provision that had not been breached. 
In this case, at the time the lease was entered into, 
the clear intent of the parties was that the Woodland Drive-In 
Theatre would be profitably managed. Otherwise, the percentage 
rental provisions and the corresponding provisions for 
plaintiff-appellant1s inspection of defendants-respondents1 
financial records would be meaningless. (See Exhibit A, 
Paragraph 2.) Paragraph 7 of the lease agreement expressly 
provides that the lessee is to approximately double the size 
of the snack bar-concessions area. After substantial delay, 
defendants built an addition to the snack bar but blocked 
it off with a cinder block wall and used it solely for storage. 
That action breached an express covenant of the lease agree-
ment as well as an implied covenant to run the theatre 
concessions in good faith in a businesslike manner, 
In Mayfair Operating Corp. v. Bessemer Properties, Inc., 
7 So.2d 342 (Fla. 1942), the Supreme Court of Florida held 
that a lessee of a movie theatre was obligated to keep the 
-25-
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theatre operating all year and do its best to maximize 
revenues under a percentage rental agreement in light of 
a provision of the lease agreement requiring it to "use its 
best efforts to obtain and maintain the highest volume of 
business on the premises." This ruling was made despite the 
lessee's uncontested allegations that lessee "made improve-
ments on the theatre not required in the lease, that the 
theatre business . . . [was] seasonal and that the theatre 
was closed in the summer months in order to maintain a high 
standard of entertainment... ." (7 So. at 343.) ° 
In this case, the lease agreement expressly provides 
that the: 
Lessee covenants to use and occupy said 
premises for the operation of a drive-in 
theatre business and any business which is 
usually incident thereto, and covenants 
and agrees to keep the improvements upon 
said premises, including all theatre 
equipment, in a good state of repair at the 
expense of the Lessee. (See Exhibit A, 
Paragraph 8.) 
Plaintiff-appellant has stated a valid cause of action 
for defendants-respondents1 failure to operate the Woodland 
Drive-in Theatre in a prudent and businesslike manner. The 
defendants-respondents had an obligation to operate the theatre 
in good faith without allowing it to deteriorate. Defendants-
respondents have disregarded that obligation in their operation 
of Woodland Theatre, and the plaintiff-appellant is entitled to 
go to trial on the issue of damages arising from their failure 
to fulfill that obligation. 
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CONCLUSION 
In granting Plitt1s motion for summary judgment, 
the trial court ignored the substantial issues of material 
fact raised by Woodland and relied erroneously on the overly 
broad propositions of law advanced by Plitt. Woodland is 
entitled to an adequate opportunity to prove its claims 
of forfeiture of the leasehold and to damages for the defendants-
respondents' breaches of the lease agreement. Such an 
opportunity was not given by the trial court, making no 
findings of fact relating to Woodland's claims. Plitt and 
ABC are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law in either 
of the plaintiff-appellant's actions, and this Court should 
accordingly reverse the trail court's summary judgment orders. 
DATED this / Q day of May, 1976. 
BERMAN & GIAUQUE 
Daniel L. Berman 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Randall L. Dunn 
500 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
(801) -£33-8383 
Richard D. Burbidge 
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant 
Woodland Theatres, Inc• 
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LEASE 
Woodland Theatres, Inc. 
Lessor, 
and 
ABC Interraountain Theatres, Inc. 
Lessee 
i 
Woodland Drive-In Theatre 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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V .*.-* 
L E A S E 
:;~'tT*THIS LEASE, made and entered into at Salt Lake City, Utah, 
".this 9th.day of March, 1971, by and between WOODLAND THEATFES, INC., 
a corporation of Utah, hereinafter referred to as Lessor, and ABC 
ZNTEBMOUNTAIN THEATRES, INC., a corporation of the State of Delaware, 
..duly qualified to do business in Utah, hereinafter referred to as \ 
Lessee? " . * " ' > " . • . 1 
- -
:
 : WITNESSETH, that in consideration of the payment of the rent 
and the keeping and performance of the covenants and agreements by 
the said Lessee, "hereinafter set forth, the Lessor hereby leases unto 
the Lessee the following described premises situated in Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah: *: 
• -*r- •:' Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 8, Block • . 
5# Ten Acre Plat MAM, Big Field Survev, and running 
•-.:.rt-:-.thence Soutli 0° 08* 26" West, 572.63 feet to the 
Southeast corner of said Lot 8; thence South 89° 59' 
•fir csw«st 206.47 feet along the South line of said Lot 8 to • 
"•*• the Northeast corner of Lot 16 A, Clearview Acre Sub-
...£*/ -division? thence South 0° 121 40M West,, 18.00 feet to 
the .Southeast corner of said Lot 16 A? thence North 89° 
54' West, 100.00 feet to the Southeast corner of said 
V Lot 16 A; thence South 89° 59' West, 100.00 feet to the 
-.-. T--Southeast corner of Lot 18 A, Clearview Acres Subdivision; 
* thence North 88° 24• 50" West, 100.04 feet to the South-
- .. west corner of said Lot 18 A; thence North 89° 02' 30" 
West 100.01 feet to the Southwest corner of Lot 19 A, 
:.r.-^ l £learview Acres Subdivision; thence North 0° 12' 40" 
Bast 13.30 feet to the Northwest corner of said Lot 19 A; 
•-- -y. thence* South 89° 59' West, 160.00 feet to the Southwest 
corner of said Lot 8, Block 5, Ten Acre Plat MAM; thence 
-:•:. North 0° 12' 40" East 573.07 feet to the Northeast'corner 
"of said Lot 8; thence South 89° 59' East 89,30 feet; 
:.J(i ^thence along the arc of a 622.03' foot radius curve to 
the right, 715.24 feet to the point of beginning; said 
•*",£::.arc being subtended by a chord of South 89° 59' East, 676.48 f:«at 
" "feet. And including a 50 foot right-of-way from the 
irj.7.- -leased premises to Ninth East Street to serve as an 
entrance or exit from the Woodland Drive-In Theatre or 
. . - . a right-of-way of sufficient width to serve the purpose 
of an entrance or an exit to the Woodland Drive-In 
Theatre to Ninth East Street as required by law. 
Together with all the improvements thereon situated and 
• all.appurtenances thereto, including the swimming pool. 
Together with all of the equipment and personal property 
used in the operation of the Woodland Drive-In Theatre, 
. as set forth in the attached Schedule marked Exhibit A. 
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• • • • - • . • 
I 1. The term of this lease shall commence on the _____ * ! 
day :of , 1971, and continue for fifteen (15) 
ye--, to . * i^udin* _ , M . . . . j 
2. The Lessee covenants and agrees to pay as rental to j 
the Lessor a minimum annual guaranteed rental of Thirty-Two Thousand 
Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) per year during each year of the ; 
» 
term of this Lease or any extension thereof. Except for the first 
year of the term of this Lease, such minimum annual guaranteed rental 
shall he paid annually in twelve (12) monthly installments of Two 
Thousand Seven Hundred Eight'Dollars and Thirty-Three Cents ($2,708*33). 
Each installment shall be due on the first day of each month of each 
lease yearf commencing with the first month of the second year of 
the term of this Lease. The minimum annual guaranteed rental of 
i . * 
Thirty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) for the first 
year of the fifteen (15) year term of this Lease shall be paid by the 
Lessee to the Lessor within thirty (30) days after the commencement :" 
date of this Lease. The parties acknowledge that the Lessor has \ 
already received Twenty-Five Thousand Dollars ($25,000*00) of such 
Thirty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($32,500.00) prepaid minimum 
annual guaranteed rental and that the Lessee shall only be required to 
pay the Lessor an additional Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($7,500.00) within thirty (30) days from the commencement date of this 
Lease and upon the payment of such Seven Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
($7,500.00) the Lessee shall have fully prepaid the* minimum annual 
guaranteed rental of Thirty-Two Thousand Five Hundred Dollars 
".($32,500.00) for the first year of the original fifteen (15) year term 
of this Lease. 
^ The Lessee, in addition, covenants and agrees to pay as a 
percentage rental to the Lessor during each year of the term of this 
Lease or any extension thereof: ' . ..-••' 
A. Fifteen percent .(15%) of the gross admission 
receipts, if any, of the Theatre in excess 
• . •' of One Hundred Eighty-Three Thousand Three 
Hundred and Thirty-Three Dollars ($183,333.00), 
. and 
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B. Fifteen percent (15%) of the gross concession 
receipts, if any, of the Theatre in excess 
5 of Sixty-Five Thousand'Dollars ($65,000.00) . 
i 
The gross admission receipts and gross concession receipts of the 
Theatre upon which the determination of the percentage rental, if any, 
due under this Lease are to be computed, shall be calculated at the 
end of each year of the. term of this Lease and the amount of percentage 
rental, if any, due the Lessor as percentage rental shall be paid by 
the Lessee without demand no later than thirty (30) days after the 
end of each such lease year. A written statement of gross admission 
receipts and of gross concession receipts, certified to be correct by 
a financial officer of Lessee, shall be delivered by Lessee to Lessor 
within such thirty (30) day period regardless of whether any per-
centage rental is due under the Lease. * 
' The Lessee shall regularly 'keep proper books of account 
showing gross admission receipts and gross concession receipts from 
the Theatre, which books shall during regular business hours of the 
Lessee be open to the inspection of .Lessor and its agents at Lessee's 
office in Salt Lake City, Utah* 
Gross admission receipts as used for purposes of this Lease 
shall mean the total receipts for admission to the Theatre, including 
all ticket sales, less any and all taxes and license fees applicable 
to such admission receipts required to be paid by any governmental 
authority, whether local, county, city, state or federal. 
Gross concession receipts as used for purposes of this Lease 
shall mean any receipts from the sale of concession commodities, 
including snack bar sales; food-, candy, and soft drinks on the Theatre 
premises, less any and all taxes and license fees applicable to any 
such gross concession receipts required to be paid by any governmental 
authority, whether local, county, city, state or federal. 
The Lessee in no way guarantees that there shall be any 
percentage rental earned and due and'payable under the terms and 
conditions, of this Lease. 
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Lease year shall mean a period of twelve (12) consecutive 
calendar months during the term of this Lease, measured from the first 
day of the first full calendar month of the term of this Lease and 
ending on the day prior to each anniversary of said first, day of the 
first full calendar month. 
In addition to the annual financial statement with regard 
to gross admission receipts and gross concession receipts provided 
' for above, the Lessee agrees to furnish Lessor with a quarterly 
statement of gross admission and gross concession receipts and shall 
make available for the Lessor's inspection the daily box office 
reports. 
i. t 
! i! 
t i 
. . 3. The Lessee shall have thirty (30) days grace and no 
. more in which to pay any annual percentage rental payment to the 
Lessor from the date such rental payment is due under Paragraph 2 
s.above. •_ t.^.y**-. . * .-• 
4. The Lessor shall pay the general personal property and 
real property taxes levied against'the leased premises during the 
of::—. _:. . 
term of this leaser, provided, however, the Lessee agrees to pay any 
increase ToT taxes over and above the amount of the taxes for the 
"year 1963, which shall be levied during the term of the lease. Lessor 
. shall furnish to Lessee upon request a copy of each tax bill required 
to be paid (in part) by Lessee under this paragraph as well as a copy 
^of the bill for the 1963 tax yearT 
5. Lessee agrees to pay all utilities, including water, 
-heat, lights and sewer charges and Lessee also agrees to pay all 
_city, county, state and federal licenses, or any licenses that may be 
-imposed by any other governmental agency. 
__ .. . - £ —
 N o paragraph 6. 
7. The Lessee covenants and agrees that the Lessee shall, 
: within six (6) months from the date of the effective date of this 
Lease enlarge the present snack bar to approximately double its present 
i 
i' 
V 
I 
•1 
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. size. The Lessee shall be relieved of the obligations pursuant.to 
this paragraph if zoning regulations prohibit the fulfillment of such 
obligations or government approval for such construction cannot be 
obtained, but the Lessee and Lessor shall undertake to use their best 
efforts to obtain any zoning classification and any approval 
necessary to the fulfillment of their obligations* Lessee further ' 
covenants and agrees to move the existing marquee from its present 
location to the northwest property line of the demised premises on 
Seventh East and to situate such marquee of such location so that both 
sides of the double marquee are utilized to advertise the present 
attraction; to provide larger lamp houses, and to oil and chip the 
demised premises, all to be done prior to December 31, 1S71. 
8. The Lessee covenants to use and occupy said premises for 
the operation of as drive-in theatre business and any business which 
is usually incident thereto, and covenants and agrees to keep the im-
provements upon said premises, including all theatre equipment, in a 
good state of repair at the expense of the Lessee, In this connection, 
tKe Lessee agrees to replace any equipment, at its expense, as such 
replacement shall become necessary in the proper and effective opera-
tion ofthe theatre' business. Such replaced equipment shall be the 
e^ivalent to> or better than, that which is replaced. The Lessee 
6hail3r keep the premises free from all litter, dirt, debris, and 
obstructions, and in a clean, sanitary condition, as required by all 
ordinances and health and police* regulations ? nor shall said premises 
be used for any purposes which are unlawful, or which would render the 
insurance thereon void or the insurance risk more hazardous. At the 
expiration of the lease. Lessee agrees to surrender possession to 
Lessor of the said premises and the improvements and equipment upon 
said premises in a good state of repair, ordinary wear and tear, 
acts of God, and damage by fife or other insured casualty excepted. 
! |5! 
• hi 
9. As a part of the consideration of the execution of this 
Lease by Lessee, Lessor warrants that Lessor is the owner of the 
above described real and personal property, and that if Lessee shall Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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perform all the covenants of this Lease b y said Lessee to be performed, 
•the Lessee shall and may peaceably and quifetly have, hold and enjoy 
* * 
'the said demised property for the full term aforesaid. kM 
<2iT. 
1 0 . "'The Lessee agrees that during the term of the lease 
• the present name o f the theatre shall not b e changed, except that 
Lessee may indicate its operation of the theatre, provided such 
additional designation or description shall be subordinate to the name 
Woodland Drive-In Theatre? and the name "Park Vu", or any name other 
than Woodland, shall not b e displayed in any marquee or signature 
"*. . i 
display in newspaper advertising, 
v - •: xi* T h e Lessee covenants and agrees that it will not assign 
" this Lease or enter into any sublease of the premises or any part 
thereof, without the written consent of the Lessor, which consent 
Lessor agrees not to unreasonably withhold, provided that the Lessee 
m a y assign this lease or sublet the premises to a corporation in which 
Lessee or a parent o r affiliated corporation owns the controlling 
interest. In n o event shall the assignment of this Lease relieve the 
Lessee of its obligations to the Lessor hereunder. 
rerli-Cv.:.;-:.. £..3... ....;. . ;•;;.*..--:•/ ::. -.. . ;.. ; 
tier, ci ::;v:-i2#'rlessee agrees to assume and perform any film contracts, 
previously negotiated b y the Lessor or b y the prior occupant which 
sfitay^ nbt" liave been liquidated -and performed prior to the commencement 
ccEate*of the term o f this lease. Lessor represents that the only out-
standing unperformed film contract or contracts are as follows: 
i fl 
•H 
r .<•• 
In any event the foregoing shall apply only to film contracts with 
confirmed dates as of the commencement of the term of this Lease, 
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. ' • * 13. In the event said leased property or any part thereof 
be so damaged by fire or act of God that the same cannot be used for 
theatre purposes, the Lessor shall rebuild, repair or replace the 
same at Lessor's expense, in such manner that the same shall be equal 
to said leased property prior to such damage* In the event said 
Lessor shall not commence said repairs or replacements within sixty 
(60) days following said damage, and thereafter proceeds therewith 
with due diligence, said Lessee, at Lessee's election, may proceed to 
make said repairs or replacements and deduct the cost thereof and all 
reasonable expenses in connection therewith from the ensuing payments 
of rental required to be made hereunder, or said Lessee, at Lessee's 
election, as-aforesaid, may terminate this lease. Said Lessee shall 
be relieved from making the rental payments provided hereby during 
such part of the above-mentioned period as said premises shall be 
unfit for occupancy for theatre purposes, and also during such period 
as the theatres in the above City may be closed by the City, State or 
Federal authorities under Martial Law, Health Quarantine, or other 
emergency, and rentals paid in advance for such periods shall be 
credited upon the ensuing rental payments to be made pursuant hereto. 
14. The Lessee agrees to maintain fire insurance with full 
extended coverage, including wind damage, at Lessee/s sole expense, 
to the extent of at least 80 percent of the value of the equipment 
and improvements. The proceeds of such insurance shall be payable 
to the Lessor for the purpose of repair as aforesaid. In the event 
the proceeds of such insurance are insufficient to cover the replace-
ment cost. Lessee agrees to pay the difference of such replacement 
" i •: * * * ' 
cost.* 
15o The Lessee agrees to provide and maintain public 
liability insurance for the protection of Lessor and Lessee, covering 
the use and occupancy of the premises by the Lessee, in the sum of 
$100,000.00 for each person and $300,000.00 for each occurrence, and 
Lessee covenants and agrees to save Lessor harmless from any liability 
of any kind which may arise out of the use and occupancy of the leased 
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premises by the Lessee. , . J 
^ •" " 16. Lessor grants unto Lessee the first right to purchase 
a marketable title to the demises premises at the same price and 
upon the same terms at which the same may be offered for sale to any 
r;£r.,:' y. : * .--"••' :' • - -• ~ \ : \ . ' 
other prospective purchaser, subject to the terms of this lease# and 
Lessee shall have thirty (30) days after notice of said proposed sale 
a*. ..--*...."—- •••.". 
within which to elect whether to purchase said premises. In .the event 
Lessee notifies Lessor, within the time specified above, of Lessee's 
•election to purchase said premises, then said purchase shall be 
consummated within fifteen (15) days after service of written notice 
upon Lessor of Lessee's election to purchase the same. 
17. The parties hereto agree that in the event of any 
litigation between the parties hereto to enforce the terms of this 
lease, or pertaining to the tenancy hereby created, the court may 
award the successful party its reasonable attorneys' fees. 
•"ccrrr ="JL8# All the covenants and agreements in this lease shall 
extend to and be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators, 
successors"and'assigns"of the irrespective parties hereto. 
!• t 
i 
K 
i 
- r ; r v i. - ; vriz-cc:. r.r.19*: No paragraph 19•" 
.^  . _ 2 0 . .^ e Lessor covenants and agrees that the Lessee may 
have an option to renew this lease under the same terms and conditions 
xrCi ccr.. :.:.. .i -II. - •' '• 
and at the same rental, for a period of an -additional five (5) years. 
..Hotice of the intention to exercise this option must be given in 
writing to the Lessor at least six _(6) months before the expiration 
of this lease, otherwise such option shall terminate and be of no 
effect. .. \ 
_: 21. JThe Lessor'shall have the right to audit the books and 
records of the Lessee relating to.the leased premises once each year 
in order to verify the accuracy of the reports made to the Lessor 
with respect to the gross receipts received by Lessee during each 
year of the term. 
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i;;;y 
\ 22. Lessee covenants and agrees that it will promptly pay 
r for any improvements or replacements of equipment made by Lessee to 
| the end that no liens or repossessions occur. Title to all iigprove-
1 
J cents.and equipment and replacements thereof shall be and remain in 
I the Lessor, and possession thereof, subject to reasonable wear and 
I depreciation, shall be given to the Lessor upon the termination of 
^ • . . * i . . '. j jti 
I .this lease for any cause. , .... • .•*'•!;! 
1
 • • • • •• • • , }.•!; 
*•: 
fc
*" *23« At least sixty (60.) days prior to the expiration of 
this lease or the extension thereof, the Lessor shall have the right 
to exhibit a sign for lease conspicuously on said premises as Lessor 
may desire, 'without seriously interfering with the operation of the 
theatre by the Lessee; and at any reasonable hour of the day the 
Lessor, through its appointed representative, shall have the right 
to enter upon, inspect and view the premises. 
.24. (a) E||£ess£©~^^ 
*•: 
Vr "JS jggaiiffQ^&j:^^ 
^ i t t e h hoid.ce .specifying ±6? 
^ ijjEl^ans??^^ 
4 
tiJESt^fr'ftA+•••^•'*^^^'M^-n^^'^^^^iTT^f or (c) if Lessee shall fail to 
perform any other obligation under this lease for thirty (35) days 
after written notice specifying the default (or within such period 
Lessee has not commenced diligently to correct such default so specified 
ar. i r . ~ •.. .; •.; • 
.or has not thereafter diligently pursued such correction to completion), 
I '\J! X\T '" •• 
< v, y the date-specified- in a- not ice by., ce r t i f i ed . o r .xeg is te red mai^gff^hicly 
r\ O c : - • "'--:. '. 
i/j\ date shall not-be lesa than ten (10) days after the date of mailing, of 
ftu^ttotice'l^i^ be annulled and Lessor shall have, 
in addition to any other right or remedy Lessor may have at law or 
in equity, the right to thereupon re-enter and take possession of the 
said premises. 
The specified remedies to which either Landlord or Tenant 
may resort under the terms of this lease are cumulative and are not 
intended to be exclusive of any other remedies or means of redress to 
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which either may be lawfully ent i t led in case of any breach or 
threatened breach by the other of any provision of this lease..EffieSgj 
psrf o^ance-- pg^anyHlff : ^ ^ : a s ^ ^ 
i ^ f o i T ^ ^ W f y ? * ^ ^ 
cx. . . — - ^ ^
 ig ^ ^ intent of the parties that the number of notices 
and the time periods provided by the applicable statutes of the State 
of Utah shall not be increased or enlarged, and if Lessee is given 
the two (2) notices provided for in this Lease in order to annul this 
Lease, and the minimum time periods provided for in this Lease, -efcfcgsa 
^gi^X^ofciees^nd^uc^^ 
t .»? 
• Irj 
•Mil 
• i l i 
t. 
titarfif tfffj?' -ffl^r^iffS^5^^ fl^sfr*^ 
. . - - . . . . . . . -
 r • • - . m . : - . . 
^
 s~r .. -25. The Lessee shall make a surfacing application during 
the summer of 1971 to the surfacing of the Woodland Drive-In Theatre 
of the same grade and quality as was applied to such surfacing in the 
summer of 1967, and, thereafter, the Lessee shall make such applications 
.v--v- .- • .•.. ----- - : - • - ' " ~J 
from "time to-time as needed to keep and maintain the surfacing of the s 
"Woodland Drive-In:Theatre in good condition. On or before T^Wisr&sSZ&l 
jsgss^^iiTTTifiiT/>i97im Lessee shal l purchase four hundred (400) new 1,000 
Tir—T""*-~* -.•*"-•• ' . ". j. . •: 
Watt in-car electric heaters with thermostatic controls which shall 
become the property of Lessor as provided in paragraph 22 above. 
Lessor "shall pay Lessee half the cost of Sctid heaters. 
.*> • • . . -26. Daniel B. Woodland, Eugene N. Woodland and Patricia \2fB~-±: -i . . ;. . . .. 1 
Hutchens, and any member.of.the immediate family of said named persons, 
" : • •
 % . . . 
shall have the right to use the swimming pool at any time, provided 
that such use will not interfere with the operation of the Lessee's 
business, and provided further that such use shall be at their own 
risk; and the Lessor agrees to indemnify and save Lessee harmless 
from any claim, demand, or cause of action which may arise against 
the Lessee out of such use of the swimming pool by anyone named in 
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• • • • • * • 
27. Until further written rtc££&E?3 any notices or communi-
cations required or made pursuant to this Lease shall be directed 
• (JJ^reglitSr^^ follows: . •./' ... 
• • -To the Lessor: To Daniel B. Woodland "••• :/; : 
•.*". 755 East 4070 South '. 
'
?
 ' " .. Murray 7, Utah 
. To the Lessee: TSr^£&£z&&03£^ 
f
 .fi^We^tL&acond^SoutSftetf . * ; • 
; V V £ S & £ f c i i a 3 £ ^ f 
. ; ; . iSJife^SSSlSfiffla^ra 
. ' . j iSs^t&i&eriea^B^r^ 
.
 :
 • • &fct ^LJ^egal^Couns el-asss 
'..-.•: • i!330 Avenue of ^t^J^xieasaf 
jito^orkj&L^^ 
. 28* The Lessee shall repaint the Woodland Drive-In Theatre 
screen during the summer of 1971, and thereafter as needed during the 
term of the lease or any renewal thereof hut not less than once every 
four (4) years. • i 
29. The Woodland Drive-in Theatre shall not be expanded 
on additional property or any entrance or exit added other than the 
Ninth East entrance and exit, or any entrance or exit discontinued 
without the Lessor9s written permission, 
30. Eugene N. Woodland may have a right-of-way over the 
Ninth East exist and entrance for access to and from the property 
owned by him which adjoins on the south of said entrance and exit. 
31. The Lessor and the individual stockholders thereof 
(Daniel B. Woodland and Eugene N. Woodland) agree' to assist and 
cooperate in every necessary and ^desirable way with the Lessee to 
obtain all necessary zoning and other permits for use of the Ninth 
East exit and entrance way and for all other improvements provided 
in this lease. 
32. Neither Lessor nor its individual fetockholders will 
erect or permit to be erected on any property which they may own 
adjacent to the Woodland Drive-in Theatre any flashing or revolving 
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of the theatre watching the picture on the screen at the theatre, 
and they will not cause or permit any loud or unuspal noises in 
connection with the use of such adjoining property which will inter-
fere with the operation of said drive-in theatre, 
• • . ' . - . \ ' ' • 
33. The Lessor and Lessee agree to execute a short form 
• n. 
* .'is 
Uii 
! ; 
. • » i ; 
! !'r 
• " * ! : t -
of lease, acknowledged and otherwise in proper form for recording 
pursuant to the Statutes of Utah, pertaining thereto, This short form 
• • •, • 
shall recite (&) the date of the execution of the lease; (b) the ' „••': 
' , ' * i ; 
description of the premises demised by the lease; (c) the term of the 
lease; (d) the right of extension or renewal; and (e) the first right 
to purchase a marketable title to the demised premises. The original 
executed copy of said short form lease shall be recorded and shall be 
returned, after ::recording, to Lessee. 
34 • ^SSSEDB^ 
flOsBsijj?^^ 
}>: 
o:. cu;;....-.. >A*...Lessor shall have received an offer from a 
third party to purchase the premises for use 
izir.zz. iL'v'cr'^O:.::other than as a motion picture drive-in 
theatre; 
hm Lessee shall have been given notice thereof 
\ ' and the first right to purchase pursuant to 
. , iC. Luc-paragraph 16 of the lease and Lessee shall 
'•"'•' have failed to elect to purchase; 
.' Cm fessor^halt have given Lesse^M^^ssrVSS^ 
cvh.1.: z;':.—:.'
 k.-;. ninety (90) days advance written notice of-** 
the effective date of such termination,, Jbujs? 
.",' the effective date shall in no event be 
* 21. r./« during the.period. July~l through -Labor DayV\ 
'i^ i.icl . :-;Dw Lessor shall pay to Lessee (1) a sum equal 
.'•.••;'. to twice the amount of Lessee's investment 
c:•:•--.•;• :•.*-•• ..':;•* in the Woodland Drive-in Theatre, which 
•'• •shall include, without limitation, the 
tzt-LLii '---.:.--r.r:i. $125,000.00 paid by Lessee for the lease-
hold assignment, the cost of heaters, if 
any, {and the cost of expanding the snack 
bar, plus (2) if the effective date of/ 
"" , • .,• • termination be within the first five (S) 
years of the fifteen (15) year extendedjtesss^ 
. an_amount as follows: 
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Termination Date 
During 
1st year 
2nd year 
3rd year 
4th year 
5th year 
Added Amount 
25?6 of amount under (1). 
20% of amount under (1). 
15% of amount under (1). 
1(3% of amount under (1} . 
5% of amount under (1) • 
In addition, Lessor shall return to Lesj^ e^e^ Tny p^toaid 
rent, including the security deposity^which would \^  
otherwise be applied to rent for the' last year« ;:| 
- 'I K'^MI}* J 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Lessor, WoodJb^ gd Theatres^ Inc., and 
the Lessee, ABC Intermountain Theatres, Inc., have each executed this 
Lease by thfeir duly authorized officers and attached their seals the 
day and year first above written. 
' •»• 
•' is? 
i* • 
Mi: 
ATTEST: WOODLAND THEATRES, INC. 
MMMdkJ- By '^.. :, ^ 7^/iy/J I t s ^ '' ~ 
ATTEST: 
^~r. 
ABC INTERMOUNTAIN THEATRES, INC. 
SyV. 
Its ...X ,> 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
